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Abstract: The net neutrality norm generates wealth transfers from one type of internet content
provider to another. In theory, these transfers might be socially desirable, and could be justified
on the basis of informational externalities similar to those that have been identified to justify the
fair use doctrine in copyright law. However, in practice, the conditions that justify fair use in the
copyright context do not appear to hold in the settings in which the net neutrality principle
operates. Moreover, the internal subsidization required by net neutrality generates a transfer
from the relatively poor to the relatively rich. The potential welfare gains that might come from
controlling anticompetitive abuse or government coercion through implementation of the policy
can be achieved by alternative policies with less harmful consequences.
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Net neutrality is an appealing term. After all, what might be the conceptual antithesis of net
neutrality: net discrimination? The word discrimination suggests an evil purpose, while
neutrality suggests immediately an open, fair process. The term alone conditions one to support
the concept.
Net neutrality consists, as far as I can tell, of a regulatory norm that is as simple as it is
appealing. Providers of content transported through the networks of broadband internet firms
cannot be charged different prices by the broadband firms for the service of transporting their
content. 1 Thus, a firm that provides highly demanded content that absorbs much of the capacity
of the broadband network cannot be charged for the additional congestion and wear-and-tear
associated with the transporting of its content.
If there were no differences between the consumers of various services – for example, if
everyone consumed the same information services from the internet – net neutrality would truly
be neutral in effect. It would not permit differential pricing, or discrimination, to adversely
affect any providers of content. It would not differentially impact any consumer, since every
consumer is identical by hypothesis.
But consumers of internet services are not identical—they demand different services, which
impose dissimilar costs on broadband firms. 2 Consequently, net neutrality requires some
consumers to subsidize the consumption of others. In this sense, net neutrality is not neutral at
all: it forces A to pay for the consumption of B. Viewed from this perspective, net neutrality is a
form of differential pricing.
The basic economics of net neutrality seems similar to that of toll bridges. 3 Charging all users of
the bridge the same amount may force some users to subsidize others. This has moral hazard and
adverse selection implications. Consumer welfare declines, unless there is an efficiency case for
a regulation that requires internal subsidization of one group of consumers by another group of
consumers (cross-subsidization). 4 I will consider the possible welfare cases for such internal
1

As Becker, Carleton and Sider explain, the net neutrality principle has devolved into four specific requirements:
broadband providers are “prohibited from: (1) prioritizing traffic and charging differential prices based on the
priority status; (2) imposing congestion-related charges; (3) adopting business models that offer exclusive content or
that establish exclusive relationships with particular content providers; and (4) charging content providers to access
the Internet based on factors other than the bandwidth supplied.” (Becker, Carlton, Sider, at 498)
2
On the variation in network services and costs, see Yoo (2013).
3
The similarity is that in both contexts, one observes large up front capital expenses to construct a facility, and the
incremental cost of using the facility is comparatively small. The economics of bridges is a topic with an extensive
literature. See, e.g., Hotelling (1938); Minasian (1979). The difficult problem of optimal supply analyzed in the
earlier literature has important implications for the treatment of different types of user, and the extent to which one
can determine when the pricing of bridge services inefficiently advantages one user at the expense of another user. I
will oversimplify and avoid most of these difficulties here.
4
I use the term cross-subsidy as an equivalent to “internal subsidy”, as in Posner (1971). This is a popular, though
admittedly non-rigorous use of the term. In my treatment, a cross subsidy or internal subsidy results from a
regulation (such as a net neutrality requirement) when a firm is forced to change its pricing structure, as a result of
the regulation, in a manner that benefits one group of consumers and disadvantages another group of consumers.
The concept of cross-subsidy is difficult and would require a much more extensive treatment than offered here to
deal with adequately in economic terms. A rigorous treatment of the concept of cross-subsidy is provided in
Faulhaber (1975).
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subsidization here, drawing on familiar analogies in the law. After that, I will consider
alternative arguments for the net neutrality norm based on distributional concerns, potential
anticompetitive abuse, and government coercion.
I conclude that the case for net neutrality is weak. The potential efficiency justifications for the
policy are speculative, and unsupported so far by the evidence. The distributional consequences
of the policy are undesirable. The policy effects a transfer of resources from the less advantaged
to the more advantaged without any significant offsetting welfare gain. Every speculative gain
that might come from the policy, such as controlling anticompetitive abuse or government
coercion, can be achieved by an alternative policy with less harmful consequences.
1. The Bridge Analogy
Consider a toll bridge with two types of user: ordinary cars and heavy trucks. The difference
between the two is that the heavy trucks are more costly to the bridge owner to service because
they impose more congestion on bridge traffic. Congestion reduces the flow of traffic over the
bridge, thereby increasing the average cost of the service. In addition, the trucks impose more
depreciation (wear and tear) on the bridge. A profit-maximizing bridge owner would adopt a
system of discriminatory Ramsey prices, charging a mark-up above user-specific marginal cost
that is inversely related to the elasticity of user demand. 5 Assuming the demand elasticity of cars
is no greater than that of trucks – cars consisting of a larger percentage of leisure travelers are
more likely to seek cheaper though more time-consuming routes – the owner would charge
higher prices to trucks than to cars.
A regulatory authority that seeks to maximize welfare subject to a given level of profit promised
to the bridge owner would also choose a system of discriminatory Ramsey prices, though not
precisely the same as those chosen by the unregulated monopolist. The mark-up above userspecific marginal cost would be somewhat less, but would still vary inversely with the elasticity
of user demand. 6
Suppose, however, the regulator requires the bridge owner to charge the same price to both cars
and trucks. Under the conditions assumed, cars would, in effect, finance an internal subsidy for
trucks. As a result, trucks would tend to use the bridge more than if the cross-subsidy were not
present, and cars would use the bridge less than if the cross-subsidy were not present. The
additional use by trucks would increase congestion costs, driving up the cost of the service and
increasing depreciation costs.
Charging cars and trucks different prices would permit the bridge owner to internalize to truck
owners the additional costs imposed by the trucks. This, in turn, would discourage the trucks
from excessive use – for example, from imposing a marginal cost of $1 on the bridge owner and
other users when the marginal benefit to the truck owner from the particular use is only $.50. A
charge that varied with the intensity of the use would encourage truck owners to consider the
5

Here I refer to the simplest form of Ramsey pricing that results from profit maximization by a multi-product
monopolist. For simplicity, I assume that the user demand functions are independent of each other. For a
straightforward presentation, see Tirole (1989).
6
See generally Baumol and Bradford (1970).
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congestion costs and the miles of wear and tear imposed in each relevant time period. The higher
charge would also induce some truck owners to avoid the bridge in favor of another route. Over
time, charges might encourage technological innovation toward trucks that carry the same freight
while imposing lower congestion and depreciation costs.
Charging separate prices allows the bridge owner to reduce congestion and depreciation costs,
and pass those cost savings on to consumers in the form of lower general prices (for an
equivalent unit of service) for use of the bridge, which, in turn, would increase the total
consumption of the services offered by the bridge.
Admittedly, in some cases the bridge owner might choose not to charge differential prices.
Perhaps the differences in service costs are minor, and the administrative costs of differential
pricing exceed the efficiency gains. Alternatively, perhaps trucks provide the greatest source of
demand for new bridge capacity. Foresighted bridge owners would therefore be reluctant to tax
a major source of industrial capacity growth. In these cases, the bridge owner may choose not to
impose differential pricing even if completely free to do so.
The bridge analogy seems to apply straightforwardly to the net neutrality problem. Net
neutrality is equivalent to prohibiting the bridge owner from using differential pricing, and
generates similar costs. Some providers of internet content, such as Netflix, impose
extraordinary congestion costs as a result of the internal subsidy from consumers of other
internet services. 7 Hence, permitting the network owner to price differentially can and probably
would enhance consumer welfare. 8 To the extent that heavy use of the service has a depreciation
effect (electrical components suffer wear and tear from use), similar costs are imposed. 9
2. Is There a Case for Cross-Subsidization?
As a general matter, it is not difficult to justify cross-subsidization in the presence of significant
externalities, but the question is whether such a justification is applicable in the net neutrality
context.
Return to the bridge story. If trucks provide a positive externality to all bridge users, then crosssubsidization might be socially optimal. Suppose, for example, the trucks provide a good that
benefits other bridge users (or the consumers of those other bridge users) through a mechanism
that fails to charge a price for those external benefits. Vaccines, for example, provide a
beneficial externality to consumers who do not consume the vaccines. A subsidy toward the
trucks carrying those vaccines might be optimal. If most of the trucks carry vaccines, a subsidy
funded by cars and benefitting trucks in general might be optimal.
Similarly, if the services that impose the greatest congestion costs on the internet also provide a
positive externality to all consumers of internet services, then the cross-subsidies created by net
7

See Clark (2014).
See, e.g., Becker, Carlton, and Sider (2010); Peitz, Martin and Schuett, Florian (2015). In my example in the text,
if the privately-chosen prices are relatively close to the socially optimal Ramsey prices, then unregulated monopoly
would enhance welfare relative to the equal-pricing rule.
9
Although the empirical importance of such depreciation may be entirely speculative, for a model that incorporates
depreciation as a factor, see Odlyzko (1997).
8
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neutrality might be socially optimal. The informational services that are often cited for
providing important positive externalities to society are educational. Educational services
enhance the stock of human capital, and thereby help to make members of society more
productive, or otherwise advance science and culture. Because of these benefits, the law has in
some cases provided an implicit subsidy for informational services that are primarily
educational.
The fair use doctrine of copyright law, for example, imposes a subsidy funded by one type of
information service for the benefit of another type of information service: from the holder of a
copyright to an infringer of the copyright. Under the fair use doctrine, an agent who copies
copyrighted material is not infringing if the use is deemed fair. Fair use is determined by several
factors, such as the extent and purpose of the copying. One key factor supporting a finding of
fairness is copying for educational purposes. Educational purposes can be understood broadly to
include information that advances culture. Satire, for example, arguably has an educational
purpose, because it is through satire that the public becomes aware of the shortcomings or flaws
of certain theories or works of art. For example, Alice Randall’s The Wind Done Gone provides
an account, deemed a parody by one court, of the fictional events from Margaret Mitchell’s Gone
With the Wind, told from the eyes of slaves rather than from the eyes of slaveholders. In a
society matured to the stage that its prior belief that one particular race should be given the legal
power to hold another race in slavery now seems comically unjust, Randall’s retelling, from an
upside-down perspective, of a famous work of art embodying the now-discredited view of social
order has significant educational value. By subsidizing such iconoclastic works of literature, fair
use doctrine probably enhances society’s welfare. 10
Cross-subsidization of the sort required under the net neutrality principle is therefore not foreign
to the common law, which for the most part strongly protects property rights, nor necessarily
harmful to social welfare. The question is whether this fair-use based theory of crosssubsidization helps justify arguments supporting net neutrality.
If the providers of heavily demanded internet content were providing educational services, or
informational services that generally enhance the stock of human capital, then the net neutrality
norm might lead to a socially optimal regulatory regime. However, as far as I am aware, this is
not the case. Netflix, for example, streams popular movies and television shows through the
internet, using an extraordinary amount of pipe capacity as it does so. Some of the shows are
critically acclaimed, but I doubt that any of them could be accurately described as educational in
any significant sense. The most popular Netflix program, House of Cards, offers a realistically
cynical view of the inner workings of American politics, but such depictions of the political
system have been part of western literature for a long time and probably do little to significantly
enhance the stock of human capital. To be sure, Shakespeare also gave us realistically cynical
portraits of the inner workings of politics, but the similarity between Shakespeare and House of
Cards is probably equivalent to the similarity between a Rembrandt and a typical piece of

10

Gordon (1982).
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critically-acclaimed modern art: one truly educates and significantly enhances culture while the
other mainly reflects the current tastes of the median consumer.
Economides and Tag (2012) offer the most prominent externality justification for network
neutrality to date, though it is different from the fair-use based theory just described. Instead of
externalities across different types of consumer, the external effect may be network externalities
between consumer and content provider. 11 Network effects may work in both directions across
the platform, with more consumers generating more content, and more content generating more
consumers. The broadband network provider may tend to overcharge the content provider
relative to the social optimum. If the network externality suggested by Economides and Tag is
sufficiently strong, implementation of the network neutrality norm might result in an optimal
outcome.
Although the Economides and Tag result is rather weak – under special conditions net neutrality
might be socially optimal – there are still reasons to question its applicability to the real world.
The result requires strong assumptions, such as identical consumers and inelastic demand.
However, much of the economic controversy surrounding network neutrality stems from the
heterogeneity of consumers and the existence of some degree of demand elasticity for network
services. The bridge analogy with which this paper begins assumes these features. Moreover,
the empirical evidence regarding the importance of provider-to-consumer network effects is
speculative at this stage, 12 and the theory may not capture all of the relevant externalities
(Becker, Carlton, Sider, 2010).
3. Distributional Considerations
On distributional grounds, cross-subsidizing informational services can harm social welfare, at
least under a Rawlsian perspective, 13 which disfavors wealth transfers from the materially
advantaged to the relatively disadvantaged. A Rawls-inspired welfare function would
incorporate the distribution of resources as a component of social welfare. 14 A more equal
distribution of resources reduces the frequency of instances where individuals are born into, or
somehow find themselves through no fault of their own, in impoverished households. Thus,
institutions that reduce the risk of being placed into such households enhance society’s welfare if
members of society are sufficiently risk averse, and conversely institutions that increase this risk
reduce society’s welfare. This perspective suggests efficiency can be decomposed into general

11

Nicholas Economides and Joacim Tåg (2012).
The provider-to-consumer network effect, which is important for Economides and Tag, can be examined in the
context of newspapers to get a sense of its plausibility. The argument is similar to saying that more newspapers
leads to more newspaper readers. While it is highly plausible that more readers will tend to generate more
newspapers, it is not immediately plausible that more newspapers will generate more readers. In addition, it is the
content provided by the newspapers that might plausibly generate more readers, not the number of newspapers.
Thus, an enhancement of quality (content) coupled with a reduction in quantity might have a stronger feedback
effect on the number of consumers than a simple increase in quantity.
13
Rawls (1971).
14
See, e.g., Posner (1981, at 59). Of course, one could say that this is just an ordinary social welfare function that
takes risk-aversion into account. See id.
12
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efficiency (or “wealth maximization”) and distributional efficiency concerns. I will focus on the
distributional efficiency concern here.
On the distributional effects of imposing cross-subsidies in information services, consider the
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). Because of the greater educational value of its
programming, the BBC generally has a stronger claim to subsidies than does Netflix, yet the
BBC subsidy is regressive in distributional terms. It reduces the price of a service consumed
mainly by the wealthy and compels the poor, through its government funding, to pay part of the
cost of providing those services to the rich.
Similarly, to the extent net neutrality results in subsidizing Netflix, it imposes a regressive tax on
society. The Netflix programs are less high-brow than those of the BBC, and as a result have a
greater appeal to the average middle-income consumer, but the poorest of the poor are unlikely
to be among the heavy consumers of Netflix. A recent study of the demographics of Netflix
users notes that “when compared to the average U.S. adult, recent Netflix subscribers are: (a)
Gender: Fairly even gender split, 49% male, 51% female; (b) Age: 37% are Millennials (18-34),
which is 23% more likely than average; (c) Residential status: slightly more likely to be adults
who still live with their parents, although the majority (61%) of recent subscribers are
homeowners; (d) Suburban living: 50% live in the suburbs, which is slightly more than average
(+9%); (e) Household income (HHI): 42% have a HHI of $50K and under, 35% have a HHI of
$50K-$100K, and 23% have a HHI over $100K; (f) Education: They are slightly more likely
than average (+11%) to say their highest level of education is an associate or bachelor’s degree;
(g) Parental status: 24% more likely to be parents and 52% more likely to have school-aged
children living with them; (h) Household: 38% more likely to have 4 or more people living in
their current household.” 15 These factors suggest that the average Netflix consumers is wealthier
than the average U.S. citizen. On distributional grounds, net neutrality therefore operates as a
regressive tax by compelling the materially less-advantaged to support the consumption of a
relatively advantaged group.
As a general rule, a norm prohibiting forced wealth transfers from the relatively disadvantaged to
the relatively advantaged appears to have a stronger appeal on welfare grounds than the net
neutrality norm. The policy against regressive transfers is likely to improve social welfare, when
distribution of wealth is taken into account, while the net neutrality norm degrades distributional
efficiency. If net neutrality enhanced general efficiency – that is, enhanced society’s wealth –
then it might be desirable in spite of its negative distributional effects. But the general efficiency
argument for net neutrality is ambiguous, lacking empirical support currently, and unlikely to be
proven valid even when the empirical evidence has been fully explored. Hence, the net
neutrality norm at present offers an unambiguous reduction in distributional efficiency coupled
with a likely negative impact on general efficiency.
The norm against regressive coerced transfers operates generally, while the net neutrality norm
operates within a narrow subset of society. This suggests an important difference between the
two norms, with distributional implications. The policy disfavoring regressive transfers is
15

http://civicscience.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/CivicScience-Netflixs-New-Users-May-2015-Final.pdf.
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unlikely to serve effectively as a veil for concealing the aims of some faction interested in
transferring wealth to itself, because it operates across a wide spectrum of society. A narrow
faction that appeals to the antiregressiveness principle purely out of self-interest – that is, to
justify efforts to expropriate wealth from others – could easily find itself losing as a result of the
principle just as much as it gains. The net neutrality norm, by contrast, offers a narrowly tailored
argument that, by seeming to invoke a lofty goal, obscures self-interested motives. The
beneficiaries of net neutrality form a concentrated interest group, and therefore would benefit
from a norm that conceals an effort to persuade government to transfer wealth in its favor. Given
the net neutrality norm’s usefulness as an instrument that simultaneously facilitates and obscures
expropriative activity in the political process, it should be regarded with some suspicion from a
distributional efficiency perspective.
4. Vertical Integration
One reason the bridge analogy may seem incomplete as stated previously is that in some settings
the ability to price differentially among bridge users might be used in an anticompetitive manner.
Suppose one truck service purchases the bridge and charges high prices to rival truckers to use
the bridge. This scenario is often described as the essential facilities problem in antitrust, where
the classic case, United States v. Terminal Railroad, 16 involved a consortium of railroads that
purchased a bridge (actually, the rail terminal facilities connected to the bridge) that had to be
used by competing railroads. In the internet network setting, a vertically integrated network
owner (integrated into content) might use differential pricing to harm competitors in the content
market. 17
I have already established that differential pricing could encourage efficient (in a second-best
sense) consumption of bridge services, and the same is true of general platforms such as a
broadband network. Differential pricing might also provide the most efficient method of
recouping the costs of constructing a platform, such as a bridge or a broadband network. 18 The
net neutrality norm is therefore inadvisable because of its efficiency costs. However, net
neutrality might be defended still, because it prevents anticompetitive price discrimination
among platform users.
There are reasons to question this argument for net neutrality. First, net neutrality goes further
than necessary. Antitrust laws already exist for regulating anticompetitive conduct, and they
attempt to regulate with a finer brush than the net neutrality rule. An antitrust court would take
efficiencies into account in any analysis of a complaint against a vertically-integrated platform
owner on antitrust grounds. The net neutrality principle ignores efficiencies.
Second, the market provides disincentives to predatory abuse in the vertical integration setting.
If vertical integration yields no efficiencies, the vertically-integrated bridge owner will be
punished, to some degree, by capital markets as investors observe the risk that the vertically
integrated owner might reduce the market value of the bridge in order to provide an advantage to
16

224 U.S. 383 (1912).
See, e.g., Hazlett and Wright (2012).
18
On Ramsey pricing and broadband networks, see Yoo (2013, at 580).
17
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its own content flowing over the bridge. This may seem speculative, at first, but examples exist.
Keurig, a maker of coffee brewing devices famously associated with the small plastic cups (Kcups) used for making coffee, recently abandoned its effort to lock out the products of rival Kcup makers from compatibility with its brewing device. When Keurig attempted to switch to a
new brewing device that made rival K-cups technologically incompatible, the firm’s stock price
dropped so quickly that it reversed course and announced that it would continue marketing a
device that could accommodate rival cups. Moreover, this reversal happened despite the fact that
Keurig had virtually no significant competition in the market for its brewing devices.
The Keurig experience suggests that a firm that owns a facility which rivals must access to
provide service to customers may suffer a severe penalty in the capital markets for attempting to
exclude rival service providers. The value of the facility is determined by the overall quality and
variety of services that the facility can provide. Locking out rival service providers may reduce
the value of the facility. Hence, predatory exclusion is not always a costless exercise, even in the
absence of the threat of competition or antitrust penalties, and in the case of Keurig would have
been permitted by the capital market to occur only if it were efficient.
Broadband firms face the same capital market constraints as the makers of coffee brewing
devices. If content exclusion were an efficient strategy for broadband firms, capital markets
would steer them toward it. But remarkably few instances that potentially could be described as
anticompetitive content exclusion have been observed. 19
Finally, direct competition with other platform providers constrains anticompetitive abuse.
While high-speed broadband networks tend to face few competitors in most American markets, 20
the existence of geographic markets in which some consumers have access to more than one
high-speed network suggests that the threat of competitive entry exists in the broadband market.
Google’s fiber service exists in three cities and promises to expand to more, 21 and other
technological novelties are in the development phase. 22 Moreover, the most heavily demanded
content providers, which create the greatest congestion costs, also drive a substantial share of the
demand for high-speed networks – an external effect which broadband providers have strong
incentives to consider. An anticompetitive move to disadvantage such content, merely to
provide a short-term boost in content owned by the vertically-integrated network, would risk a
larger loss in market share in the future as competitive substitutes develop. The recentlyapproved merger between AT&T and DirecTV is partially premised on the argument that the
combined entity will be able to take advantage of scale economies to invest in a more expansive
broadband network. If those argument are at least partially true, they signal to incumbent firms

19

See Hazlett & Wright (2012, at 782).
Most people have only one high-speed broadband provider, see http://consumerist.com/2014/12/18/govt-reporttrue-high-speed-broadband-competition-in-the-u-s-remains-largely-nonexistent/.
21
Google Fiber gigabit service is expanding, but only in three cities now, see
http://consumerist.com/2015/10/29/shortlist-of-future-google-fiber-cities-keeps-getting-longer-three-more-citiesadded/.
22
And there are new ideas for bringing high-speed internet, such as small satellites:
http://consumerist.com/2015/06/11/the-guy-who-started-tesla-wants-to-shoot-the-internet-to-you-from-space/.
20
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that anticompetitive abusive treatment of content providers is at best a short-term strategy with
great long-term risks.
Perhaps the bigger issue in the competitive landscape for broadband is the role of
Schumpeterian, or dynamic, competition. At any given moment, the market for high-speed
broadband can be defined in a manner that seems to imply that most consumers are vulnerable to
mistreatment by firms with monopoly power. Network quality improves through substantial
capital investments, and short-run market power provides the primary incentive for such
investments. At the same time, technology continually generates new types of content or
methods of enhancing existing content, in turn creating more demand for higher quality
broadband networks. The recent history of the market appears to one of chicken-and-egg
evolution with advances in networks supporting advances in content, and advances in content
creating demand for more sophisticated networks.
Yet, if every time a substantial investment in network quality occurs, regulatory agencies treat
the resulting picture of high concentration, when the market is defined by selecting the highest
quality broadband service, as evidence of a lack of competition and therefore a justification for
price regulation, then incentives to invest will be dulled. Indeed, the factions that demand price
regulation will always be able to find an empirical justification given the economic relationship
between quality, investment, and market concentration. This generates the paradoxical result
that as the potential for significant network quality improvements increases – resulting in more
choices for consumers among different levels of service quality – the threat of burdensome
regulation based on a static vision of competition increases too.
5. Government Coercion
Another reason the bridge analogy may seem incomplete is that it leaves out the problem of
government coercion as a potential justification for the net neutrality norm. The government
coercion problem provides net neutrality proponents with perhaps their strongest argument, but it
is far from compelling in the end.
The threat of government coercion in the broadband service market arises in two settings; one
potentially desirable from a social welfare perspective, and the other almost certainly
undesirable. The potentially desirable form of coercion arises as a response to internet piracy.
Content owners have sued internet service providers, seeking a more active effort by the network
providers to block pirate websites or sellers of knock-off products. 23 Content owners invariably
argue that the internet service providers have not done enough to ensure that copyrights or
trademarks are not regularly infringed through their networks. In the case of trademarks, the
networks typically make available cheap knock-offs of established brands that either directly
infringe the established trademark, or exhibit sufficient similarity to have the same effect (trade
dress infringement).

23

MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005); BMG Rights Management (US) LLC et al. v. Cox
Enterprises Inc. et al., case number 1:14-cv-01611, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.
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As a general matter, broadband networks should not be held strictly liable for copyright or
trademark infringement. The networks provide a valuable social good by enhancing the flow of
information in society. The positive spillover benefits provided by broadband networks probably
outweigh the harms to copyright and trademark owners. Still, the remaining question is whether
the owners of broadband networks have an obligation to monitor the theft of intellectual property
and just how much effort such an obligation would entail on their parts.
The net neutrality norm enters here with an obvious application. Broadband network owners
may prefer something like a network neutrality rule as a barrier to any claims of liability for
copyright or trademark infringement. A broadband network could assert the neutrality norm as a
justification for treating all content providers alike, and for reluctance to differentially treat any
of its content providers. A network neutrality rule enacted into law might provide a powerful
preemption defense to any broadband network sued for facilitating infringement of intellectual
property.
In this setting, the net neutrality norm provides an overly broad principle that stands in the way
of designing an optimal regulatory scheme. To monitor and control the infringement of
intellectual property, broadband providers may have to adopt more aggressive measures than
have been adopted to date. Courts applying standard negligence principles are in an ideal
position to determine the proper balance between risk and precaution on the part of broadband
providers. A net neutrality regulation, asserted in an effort to preempt a court from applying
negligence principles, would effectively remove courts from an area of regulation in which they
have traditionally operated, and in which they may be able to provide an appropriate solution to
conflicting interests.
The other form of government coercion I referred to earlier, which is not socially desirable, is
state-directed control of internet content. The net neutrality norm arguably provides the benefit
of enabling broadband networks to cite the norm (or regulation) as a justification for refusing to
carry out the censorship aims of a particular government. Here, the norm appears to be
unnecessary in a society in which the government is constrained to protect free speech, and
wholly ineffective in a society in which the government is not so constrained. In the United
States, the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution should form a sufficient legal basis for any
broadband provider to resist efforts on the part of the U.S. government to control content,
especially of a political nature, on the internet. It is not clear what a net neutrality norm could
provide beyond the protection already provided by the constitutional guarantee of free speech. If
anything, a net neutrality norm would likely be harmful in preventing the government from
establishing, through either judicial or regulatory standards, optimal regulations to control abuses
such as copyright infringement.
What if, instead of the government directing the network to constrain speech, the network itself
attempts to constrain speech? For example, suppose a network announces that it will impose a
special charge on content providers who intend to transmit speech the network regards as
offensive to some particular person or group? The neutrality principle would arguably promote
free expression in this special case by preventing the network firm from imposing discriminatory
viewpoint-based charges. However, there are several reasons to doubt the desirability of the
10

neutrality norm even in this scenario. First, the neutrality norm goes too far by prohibiting all
discriminatory charges rather than limiting its prohibition to viewpoint-based discriminatory
charges. As in the scenarios considered earlier (anticompetitive abuse, preemption), the
neutrality rule prohibits desirable forms of discrimination in an effort to root out potentially
undesirable forms of discrimination. Second, competitive pressures (for customers, for capital)
will constrain the incentives of network firms to discriminate on the basis of viewpoint. Indeed,
if viewpoint discrimination were attractive to consumers, the heavy-handed internet censoring
observed in China would not be met by massive efforts to circumvent it. Third, large broadband
firms have valuable contracts with federal and state governments, 24 and would surely put these
contracts at risk by engaging in viewpoint-based discrimination of content providers. These last
two considerations suggest that the market will discourage broadband firms from engaging in
viewpoint-based discrimination among content providers.
In a government that is not constrained (through both law and actual enforcement) to protect free
speech, such as that of China, a net neutrality norm would be the feeblest of barriers against
government coercion. The content providers themselves would face the threat of punishment if
they were to violate the government’s censorship rules. Broadband providers might or might not
comply with a rule of net neutrality, but it would make no difference to the underlying problem
of censorship by the government. Indeed, the net neutrality norm might facilitate the
government’s censorship by preventing broadband providers from taking any actions that might
counteract the government’s direct control over content providers. The net neutrality norm could
then be paraded ostentatiously by the censoring government as a sign of its relative
enlightenment.
6. Conclusion
In theory, implementing the net neutrality norm might be socially desirable, and could be
justified on the same grounds as the fair use doctrine in copyright law. However, in practice, the
conditions that justify fair use in the copyright context do not appear to hold in the settings in
which the net neutrality principle operates. Moreover, the cross-subsidization required by net
neutrality generates a transfer from the relatively poor to the relatively rich. For every potential
social gain that might be provided by the neutrality policy, an alternative, narrower policy exists
that would be at least as effective and less likely to have harmful side effects. Efficiency and
equity considerations provide no support for the net neutrality norm.

24

For example, on Comcast’s government business, see http://business.comcast.com/ethernet/industrysolutions/government.
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